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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TRIBAL RECOGNITION
CHRISTOPHER A. FORD*
INTRODUCTION
When is an Indian tribe an Indian tribe? Just as importantly, who may
make this decision? Jurisprudentially, such questions are quite significant,
since Native American tribal institutions occupy a unique place in American
jurisprudence. When an Indian' group is declared to be an Indian tribe for
purposes of federal law, dramatic legal consequences result: the group receives
certain important powers of self-government within a defined territory, the
group is brought within the reach of an enormously far-reaching federal super-
visory power, and members of that group and the territory they inhabit can be
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state in which they are located. The
federal government's powers over Indian affairs are predicated upon this rec-
ognition function.
At present, this recognition function is carried out through an ordinary
administrative process authorized by congressional statute. Congress has given
the President the power to "prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for
carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian af-
fairs." 2 Pursuant to these provisions, the President, through the Secretary of
Interior has promulgated rules to control the federal government's
"acknowledg[ment] that certain American Indian groups exist as tribes."3 Fed-
eral acknowledgment "is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits
of the federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as
tribes."4
* Associate, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Harvard, 1989; Ph.D. (Philosophy),
Oxford University (Christ Church), 1992; J.D., Yale Law School, 1995; Junior Research Fellow,
Wolfson College, Oxford, 1991-92. The author is grateful to Jerilyn DeCoteau and Donald
Wharton for their encouragement and support. Most of all, however, he wishes to thank his wife
Jennifer Lynn Davis-Ford for her boundless love, kindness, and patience.
1. This article will use the ancient misnomer "Indian" to refer to Native Americans, both
for reasons of convenience and because the use of this term in United States legal contexts-e.g.,
court holdings and federal legislation-remains as yet unsupplanted by more accurate phrasing.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
3. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (1995).
4. Id.
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If a group wishes to have itself acknowledged as an Indian "tribe" for
purposes of federal Indian law, it must overcome a series of administrative
obstacles, beginning with the filing of a letter of intent to achieve tribal status
with the Department of the Interior5 and culminating in a formal petition de-
tailing their claim to such status and marshaling evidence for it.6 If, after a
formal administrative notice-and-comment period,7 elaborate procedures for
hearings and the publication of proposed findings,' and formal reconsideration
of adverse determinations,9 the Assistant Secretary of the Interior determines
that the group "satisfies all of the [specified] criteria" for tribal status, he or
she is obliged to declare the group a tribe."'
The standards for tribal acknowledgment, as set out in the relevant federal
regulations, require the candidate group to meet seven basic criteria. The
group must have been "identified as an American Indian entity on a substan-
tially continuous basis since 1900,"" and "[a] predominant portion of the
petitioning group [must comprise] a distinct community [that] has existed as a
community from historical times until the present."' 2 The group must also
have "maintained political influence or authority over its members as an au-
tonomous entity from historical times until the present,"" must provide the
Department of the Interior with a copy of its "governing document" or "a
statement describing in full its membership criteria and current governing
procedures,"' 4 and demonstrate that its "membership consists of individuals
who descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity."' 5
5. Id. § 83.4.
6. Id. § 83.6(a). The regulations, however, note that evaluation of such petitions "shall take
into account historical situations and time periods for which evidence is demonstrably limited or
not available. The limitations inherent in demonstrating the historical existence of community and
political influence or authority shall also be taken into account." Id. § 83.6(e).
7. Id. § 89.3.
8. Id. § 83.10.
9. Id. § 83.10-.11.
10. Id. § 83.10(m).
11. Id. § 83.7(a). Sub-sections 83.7(a)(l)-(6) list a series of ways in which this identification
may have taken place-such as identification as an Indian entity by anthropologists and historians,
§ 83.7(a)(4), or a course of dealing with a county, parish or other local government on a basis
predicated upon the group's Indian identity, § 83.7(a)(3)--any one or combination of which will
allow the petitioner group to meet the "identification" criterion of § 83.7(a).
12. Id. § 83.7(b); see also id. § 83.7(b)(l)-(2) (giving examples of how continuous existence
might be shown). For these purposes, incidently, "historical times" means "dating from first sus-
tained contact [of the group] with non-Indians." See Id. § 83.1.
13. Id. § 83.7(c); see also id. § 83.7(c)(l)-(2) (giving examples of ways to show such main-
tenance of political influence or authority).
14. Id. § 83.7(d).
15. Id. § 83.7(e). The petitioner group must also provide "an official membership list, sepa-
rately certified by the group's governing body, of all known current members of the group." Id. §
83.7(e)(2). These regulations are poorly drafted. Since "tribe" is defined simply as any Indian
community "that the Secretary of the Interior presently acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe,"
id., § 83.7(e) might seem to require that the petitioner group consist of persons descended from an
Indian community presently recognized by the Department of the Interior. This seemingly restric-
tive condition may not be rigidly applied in practice. Moreover, because "historical" is defined as
"dating from [the] first sustained contact with non-Indians," id. § 83.1, the rule might seem even
to require candidate groups be descended from those so recognized from the time of the first
Indian-European contacts-long before there was a Department of the Interior.
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Finally, neither the petitioner group nor its members can be "the subject of
congressional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden" federal
relations with that group as an Indian tribe. 6
The administrative process of Indian acknowledgment is conducted by the
executive branch pursuant to a statute enacted by a legislature given the con-
stitutional power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes."' 7 This
is the federal government's means of designating the groups that form the
focus of its power to regulate Indian affairs. It may be, however, that this
process is not the only way tribal acknowledgment can come about.
Despite the legislature's general preeminence in Indian affairs under the
so-called Indian Commerce Clause, the federal government's Indian authority
is not wholly monopolized by Congress. Rather, the doctrine of tribal sover-
eignty and the government-to-government character of federal relations with
Indian tribes-principles that necessarily underpin the entire corpus of Indian-
affairs jurisprudence-suggest also an important role for the executive branch,
particularly with respect to matters of tribal recognition. Despite the seeming
assumption by generations of courts and commentators that federal power over
Indian affairs is left entirely in the hands of Congress, there also exists an
important independent presidential power. That is, the fundamentally political
nature of the federal-Indian relationship implicates the same constitutionally-
given executive power involved in the recognition of sovereign governments in
foreign relations.
In order to explain the origins of this power and to examine its parame-
ters, this article examines the fundamental doctrines of tribal sovereignty and
political relations that underlie federal Indian law, explores the necessary
dependence of all Indian law upon this doctrine, and outlines the constitutional
division of Indian-affairs powers that flows from this understanding. The arti-
cle concludes that the President possesses a power of tribal recognition (or
acknowledgment) entirely independent of legislative enactment. While this
conclusion might conceivably lead to judicially-insoluble political conflicts
with Congress, it is the inexorable result of the political character of federal-
Indian relations.
I. THE BACKDROP OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The doctrine of Native American tribal sovereignty has its root in three
seminal Supreme Court cases from the early nineteenth century, Johnson v.
M'Intosh, s Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'9 and Worcester v. Georgia,2" all
written by Chief Justice John Marshall. Together, these decisions set forth the
16. Id. § 83.7(g); see also id. § 83.3(e) ("[G]roups which are, or the members of which are,
subject to congressional legislation terminating or forbidding the Federal relationship may not be
acknowledged under this part.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
19. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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theoretical groundwork for the entirety of federal Indian law: the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. Only against this backdrop can the importance of govern-
ment-to-government relations between tribes and the United States be under-
stood, and the centrality of the recognition power in federal Indian law be
explained.
A. Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
As recounted by Chief Justice Marshall, Indian sovereignty is largely a
story of conquest. Before the coming of Europeans to the eastern shores of
North America,2 the continent was:
held, occupied, and possessed, in full sovereignty, by various inde-
pendent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their
respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners and pro-
prietors of the soil; and who neither acknowledged nor owed any
allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or state whatev-
er.
22
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the Indians of North America formed
"a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and
of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing them-
selves by their own laws."23 These tribes were sovereign nations, even if
Europeans might not have recognized them as such.
The arrival of European explorers, traders and settlers on the shores of
this "new" continent, however, sharply abridged this original sovereignty.
Keen to seize as much as possible of the New World for themselves, but not
wishing to become embroiled in endless wars for the adjustment of colonial
boundaries, the Europeans arrived at a territorial modus vivendi by which "the
nation making the discovery [of a particular area received] the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives"24 in that area-by any means the "discov-
ering" power found to be appropriate.
[A]s they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was neces-
sary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowl-
edge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all
asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle
was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or
by whose authority, it was made, against all other European govern-
ments, which title might be consummated by possession. 5
21. Chief Justice Marshall restricted his consideration of Indian sovereignty, in these cases,
to those portions of North America claimed at various points by Dutch, English, and French au-
thorities. Of the Native American populations further south, such as the Aztec empire crushed by
Cortez, and the Incas conquered by Francisco Pizarro shortly thereafter, the Chief Justice had
nothing to say.
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 545.
23. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-43.
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
25. Id.; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (discussing how "[tlhis principle, [was]
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The simple act of "discovery," then, was deemed to give "an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."26
The roots of this Discovery Doctrine lay solely in the vast power differen-
tial between the technologically advanced Europeans and the Indians inhabit-
ing North America. Chief Justice Marshall made no pretense that this was at
all a just result. He appears, in fact, to have felt it quite unjust, and may have
perceived himself to be steering a middle course more solicitous of Indian
interests than many of his white countrymen would have preferred." Indeed,
he noted the doctrine'was not followed by Europeans venturing elsewhere in
the world.2" This was a doctrine imposed by force with which Marshall
seemed deeply uneasy, but it was one which he felt unable, at that late date of
1823, to question.
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the
usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actu-
al condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice. 9
"Conquest," he wrote, "gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the interest of all to acknowledge it, [and] gave to
the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil
and of making settlements on it").
26. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
27. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78 (3d ed. 1993) ("In
concluding that discovery gave the United States the exclusive right to extinguish the original
tribal right of possession 'by purchase or conquest,' Marshall avoided the two logical extremes:
that discovery erased all Indian title and that Indians had fee title unaffected by discovery."); Felix
S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 48 (1948) (noting that two logical extreme
positions "produced a cruel dilemma" by offering alternatives of absolute extinguishment and
absolute Indian land rights). To insist upon the latter alternative was, even by 1823, practically
impossible, but Marshall appears to have felt the former morally impermissible. In 1832, he wrote
it would be difficult:
to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could
have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the
lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the discov-
erer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessors.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. To suggest that the "feeble settlements made on the sea
coast... acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea
to sea, did not enter the mind of any man" and was an "extravagant and absurd idea." Id. at 544-
45.
28. Justice Johnson, concurring in Cherokee Nation, observed, for example:
When the populous and civilized nations beyond the Cape of Good Hope [i.e., in South
Asia and the Orient] were visited [by Europeans), the right of discovery was made the
ground of an exclusive right to their trade, and confined to that limit. When the eastern
coast of this continent, and especially the part we inhabit, was discovered, finding it
occupied by a race of hunters, connected in society by scarcely a semblance of organic
government; the right was extended to the absolute appropriation of the territory, the
annexation of it to the domain of the discoverer.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 22 (Johnson, J., concurring).
29. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92.
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respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully assert-
ed."'.. The Discovery Doctrine, therefore, was a rule derived less from the
dictates of any abstract justice than from "the actual state of things.'
One of the most significant legal effects of this doctrine was to afford
European "discoverers" the so-called right of preemption or of extinguish-
ment, 2 allowing them to exclude other European powers," and to appropri-
ate Indian lands.3' The Indian occupants of these lands retained a usufructu-
ary right of possession and use-"a legal as well as just claim to retain pos-
session of [the soil], and to use it according to their own discretion" 3 -but
the tribe possessed no power to dispose of actual title. 6
Under the so-called Doctrine of Discovery ... the discovering na-
tions held fee title to Indian land, subject to the Indians' right of
occupancy and use. This distinction between fee title and the Indians'
right of occupancy and use, sometimes called Indian title or aborigi-
nal title, gave rise to a corresponding distinction between the rights to
affect fee title and Indian title. The right to extinguish Indian title,
30. Id. at 588. Justice Marshall felt bound, he averred, to consider "not singly those princi-
ples of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature
man ... but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case,
and given us as the rule for our decision." Id. at 572. Marshall suggested that principles of "hu-
manity" required "as a general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that
their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest." Id. at
589. He viewed the ultimate object of Indian policy, however, as the complete assimilation of the
Indians:
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the
conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the
conqueror can disregard, imposes these restraints upon him; and he cannot neglect them
without injury to his fame, and hazard to his power.
Id. at 589-90. In such circumstances,
humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to prop-
erty should remain unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as
the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of
being separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers.
Id. at 589. Even here, however, he added an ominous note, suggesting that the American Indians
had been too warlike for this to work properly-with the result that humane governance was too
often "incapable of application to a people under such circumstances" and recourse had to be had
to relations "better adapted to the actual state of things." Id. at 591.
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. "The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by
force. The conqueror prescribes its limits." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
32. Oneida Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1150 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
871 (1989).
33. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
34. Interestingly, in Worcester, Justice M'Lean's concurrence advocated the position that
Europeans had a right under "[tihe law of nature, which is paramount to all other laws" to take
possession of land necessary for agricultural survival "without negotiation or purchase from the
native Indians" inhabiting it. See Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 579 (M'Lean, J., concurring).
35. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (establishing that although Indians did not hold title to land, they never-
theless possessed a recognized right of occupancy which could be extinguished only by the federal
government); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 339 (1945)
(explaining that Indians possessed a quasi ight of occupancy termed "Indian title").
36. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN AT-rORNEY GENERALS, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 3 (Julie Wrend & Clay Smith eds., 1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK] ("The right to occu-
py was therefore deemed usufructuary in nature and vested no ownership interest in a tribe that
the tribe could alienate.").
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sometimes called a right of extinguishment, was held by the sover-
eign--Great Britain in the period prior to the American Revolu-
tion .... Since the adoption of the Constitution, there has been broad
agreement that the right of extinguishment belongs to the national
government."
Lacking the power "to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased,"3 the Indians' "discovery" by Europeans ceded to those Euro-
peans the claim "to the complete ultimate title [of land], charged with [a] right
of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."39
The powers of the discovering sovereign were not only exclusive vis-c6-vis
every other European power,' but were also lodged exclusively in the United
States government itself, rather than its constituent states. This left these states
no power over the Indians except that which might be exercised with federal
consent. An Indian tribe was:
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of [a state] can have no force,
and which the citizens of [that state] have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the [Indians] themselves, or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this [Indian] nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.4'
The discoverer's rights possessed by the British Crown had passed directly to
the federal authorities with the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War in 1781.42
37. Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1150 (citations omitted).
38. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
39. Id. at 603.
40. "Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose
between them." Id. at 573.
41. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. This case arose out of an attempt by the state of
Georgia to completely dissolve the Cherokee tribal government and absorb tribal lands into the
ordinary jurisdiction and control of state authorities. State laws in 1829 and 1830 banned all tribal
acts of legislation and judicial proceedings, prohibited whites from residing in Indian areas
without a permit from the state (a license which required the swearing of an oath of loyalty to
Georgia), divided the Cherokee lands among five Georgia counties, and extended state laws to
cover all Cherokee affairs within the state's boundaries. The case arose out of the prosecution of
Worcester, a missionary from Vermont, and several others for living in Cherokee country without
the requisite license. Id. at 525-28.
42. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (stating
that "[tlhe United States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and politi-
cal"); id. at 557 (observing that treaties with Indians provide that "the Indian territory [wasl com-
pletely separated from that of the states; and . . . that all intercourse with them shall be carried on
exclusively by the government of the union").
Since then no legal transfer of Indian title is possible unless the United States itself has
been party to the proceeding. See, e.g., Oneida, 414 U.S. at 670 (holding that "[tihe rudimentary
propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal
consent apply in all of the States"); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 443 (1926) (ex-
plaining that as wards of the federal government, Indians "hold their lands subject to the restric-
tion that [their lands] cannot be alienated" without the consent of the federal government); see
also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 245 (1985) (noting that the Nonin-
tercourse Act of 1793 "merely codified the principle that a sovereign act was required to extin-
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The theory of Indian sovereignty underlies the unique relationship be-
tween the tribes and the United States government, one "unlike that of any
other two people[s] in existence . . . [and] marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist no where else. '4' As Justice Marshall famously
phrased it in Cherokee Nation:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that
right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
Indian tribes were considered neither states of the union nor "foreign" powers
within the meaning of the United States Constitution, but an odd hybrid of the
two, born of Justice Marshall's attempt to square "the actual state of things"45
with the dictates of legal principle.
The status of Indian tribes as both "distinct, independent political commu-
nities ... [and] 'a people distinct from others"'" gave them a unique consti-
tutional status. As "quasi-sovereign nations," the federal constitution "applies
to Indian nations only to the extent it expressly binds them or is made binding
on them by treaty or Act of Congress. 47 "As separate sovereigns pre-existing
guish aboriginal title and thus that a conveyance without the sovereign's consent was void ab
initio"); Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1159 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AF-
FAIRS 166 n.1 (Hough ed., 1861) and 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1903) to demonstrate George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson's understanding of this principle). Nor, it was held, could Indian tribes be "removed"
from existing reservations to locations further west-a process that occurred repeatedly as areas of
white settlement expanded-except by federal authority. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 366, 371 (1856).
As Worcester showed, state criminal laws could not reach within a tribal reservation absent
an express congressional enactment to the contrary. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. However,
"Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discrimina-
tory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). Nor did states have the power, for example, to tax Indian reserva-
tion lands or income derived from activity thereupon. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
43. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
44. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). In Cherokee Nation, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Cherokees should be considered a "foreign nation" for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 20; see U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend ... to
Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects."). The tribe did not, for some reason, assert federal question jurisdiction under the United
States Constitution which states "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20; see also
DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 2 n.5.
45. See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
46. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
47. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted); see also
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the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority." '
As extraconstitutional political bodies, [tribes] are not subject to the
constraints imposed upon the federal government and the states by the
Bill of Rights, and maintain broad powers over internal tribal matters.
They further possess common-law immunity from suit for reserva-
tion-based transactions absent express congressional or tribal consent
or implied waiver. 9
Since 1968, the tribes have indeed been made subject to much of the federal
Bill of Rights."' However, this was only by express congressional enactment,
and these guarantees are not at all coextensive with those which operate
against the federal government in the original Bill of Rights" and against the
states by virtue of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The Equal
Protection Clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)53 is narrower than
its federal constitutional analogue54 because it seeks to balance the right of
individuals to be free from discrimination against the interest of the tribe itself
in self-government."
Trans-Canada Enters. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating
that "[c]onstitutional guarantees ... are not applicable to the exercise of governmental powers by
an Indian tribe except to the extent that [these guarantees] are made explicitly binding by the
Constitution or are imposed by Congress"); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
1976) (citing several decisions "finding the Constitution inapplicable to Indian tribes, Indian courts
and Indians on the reservation").
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
49. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 5 (footnotes omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in
Santa Clara Pueblo, Indian tribes were immune to suit without their consent absent "congressional
authorization"-which could only be accomplished with clear and unambiguous statutory intent.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
50. This was accomplished by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), which provided that "[nlo Indian tribe in exercising the powers of self-
government" shall: (1) make any law abridging the freedom of religion, speech, press or assembly;
(2) conduct unreasonable searches or make unreasonable seizures; (3) subject persons to double
jeopardy; (4) compel witness or defendant self-incrimination; (5) take private property without
providing just compensation; (6) deny defendants speedy and public trials or the ability to exercise
their right to counsel or their right to be informed of charges levied against them; (7) require
excessive bail; (8) deny equal protection or due process; (9) adopt any bill of attainder or ex post
facto law; or (10) deny a jury, of at least six persons, to any defendant accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment who requests a jury trial. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
51. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
52. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.").
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
54. See Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082
(8th Cir. 1975).
55. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, explicitly noted this tension, conclud-
ing that the ICRA had not adopted the full federal Bill of Rights in order to accommodate "the
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. at 62-63. He adopted the district court's original finding that sex discrimination in tribal
membership rules that reinforced "traditional values of patriarchy"-the Pueblo had adopted a rule
which denied tribal membership to the children of tribal women and non-members--"were basic
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The practical impact of Chief Justice Marshall's tribal sovereignty doc-
trine has changed somewhat over time, as federal laws have intruded increas-
ingly upon areas of tribal self-government which had been left to the Indi-
ans.56 The jurisprudential wall Marshall constructed between state law and
tribal self-government in Worcester v. Georgia57 has also been undermined.
Today, the ability of a state to extend its jurisdiction over Indian affairs is
judged according to the extent to which this would "undermine the authority
of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence ... infringe on the right
of the Indians to govern themselves.""8
The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in
Worcester v. Georgia has given way to more individualized treatment
of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including statehood
enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the respective
rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. The upshot has
been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on
reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would
interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law.59
Nevertheless, while the contours of tribal sovereignty have been modified by
the exercise of federal power, the doctrine still serves as the core of federal
Indian law, and the foundation of everything that makes it distinctive and
distinguishes the legal status of Indians from that of all other persons within
the reach of the United States Constitution. It is the centrality of this doctrine
that ultimately leads us to the importance of the recognition power in Indian
affairs.
B. The Trust Responsibility
The peculiarities of tribal status under federal Indian law go beyond mere-
ly the "sovereign" character of tribal political authority. It has long been rec-
ognized that the legacy of discovery and conquest imposes a duty upon the
United States deriving from the "paternal superintendence of the government"
over Indian tribes,' a trust responsibility which Chief Justice Marshall
to the tribe's survival as a cultural and economic entity." Id. at 53-54.
56. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988) (extending certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights to tribal govemments); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (extending
federal criminal jurisdiction to encompass "[alny Indian who commits against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian or other person" any of a number of specified federal crimes).
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (recognizing that "Itlhe treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide
that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the govemment of the union");
see also supra text accompanying note 41.
58. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
59. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (citations omitted); see also
Eastem Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 77
(4th Cir. 1978) (holding that "[q]uestions of conflicting tribal-state jurisdiction are no longer re-
solved by automatic application of the tribal sovereignty doctrine enunciated by Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, and most controversies are settled by reliance on federal pre-
emption principles") (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
60. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 588 (M'Lean, J., concurring); see also Red Fox v. Red
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likened to the relationship between a guardian and a ward.6 The relationship
between the sovereign power of the United States and the sovereign power of
each Indian tribe was said to be "that of a nation claiming and receiving the
protection of one more powerful" against "lawless and injurious intrusions,"
rather than "that of individuals abandoning their national character, and sub-
mitting as subjects to the laws of a master."" In the somewhat condescending
phrasing that characterizes so much of federal Indian jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has declared that:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regu-
late commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative
and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions
have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation
the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders ... .63
Deriving in part from express treaty provisions64 and in part, apparently from
the dictates of "humanity,"65 the federal government has been deemed to have
"assum[ed] the duty of protection, and ... pledg[ed] the faith of the United
States for that protection."'
This trust responsibility places some limitations upon the federal
government's ability to exercise its power as discoverer, conqueror, and guard-
ian to regulate Indian affairs. The courts have imposed certain procedural
constraints upon the exercise of federal Indian powers in the form of canons
of construction governing the interpretation of treaties with Indians:67 "[Alm-
biguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned;
Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them; and Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of
the Indians."'  Similar canons of construction operate in non-treaty contexts,
Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing "[tihe relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the American Indian" as that of a "guardian and his ward, thereby placing the Indian in
a peculiar and protected status") (citing United States v. Kabinto, 456 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972)).
61. See supra text accompanying note 44; cf. supra note 30.
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555. Chief Justice Marshall declared that the United States
government had inherited the relationship the British Crown had enjoyed with the Indian
tribes-one which bound the tribes to it "as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a power-
ful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection." Id. at 552.
63. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913).
64. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555 (noting that British and United States trea-
ties with the Cherokees have assigned the Crown and the federal government, respectively, the
duty of protector of Indian interests).
65. See supra note 30.
66. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556.
67. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) (discussing canons of construction as procedural obstacles to federal Indian pow-
er).
68. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-l-ow Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAL. L. REv. 601, 617 (1975) (footnotes omitted); see also Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48 (holding
that "it is well established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit") (citations omitted).
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such as Indian affairs legislation, for example, where the intent of Congress to
extinguish Indian title or to abrogate treaty rights must be plain and unambigu-
ous.
69
The courts have suggested that "[s]ubstantive limit[s] on [the federal
government's Indian affairs] power.., do exist by virtue of the just compen-
sation provision of the Fifth Amendment."7" Though the Supreme Court has
declared Congress to "possess[] a paramount power over the property of the
Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests,"7' this
power has also been found "not [to] extend so far as to enable the government
'to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes,
without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation.'
72
Courts assessing allegations of a federal "taking" of tribal land, for example,
have tried to distinguish between congressional assertion of its eminent do-
main powers and the legislature's exercise of its trusteeship power over Indian
property. A Fifth Amendment violation may therefore be found where "a
thoroughgoing and impartial examination of the historical record"73 reveals
that Congress has not made "a good faith effort to give the Indians the full
value of the land [in] . . . transmut[ing] the property from land to money ...
[in order to effect a] substitution of assets or change of form ... [while acting
in the] traditional function of a trustee."7 As the Supreme Court declared,
"[tihe power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it
is not absolute. 75
These canons of treaty construction date back to the seminal trilogy of Indian cases decided
by the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. In Worcester, for example, Marshall
argued that it would be wrong to hold fine distinctions in treaty language against Indians "who
could not write, and most probably could not read, [and] who certainly were not critical judges of
our language." Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552. Justice M'Lean discussed how
[tlhe language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their preju-
dice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than
their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered
as used only in the latter sense.
Id. at 582 (M'Lean, J., concurring). Such canons have received endorsement from the Court ever
since, and have become an accepted part of federal Indian jurisprudence. See McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631
(1970); see also Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. Wash-
ington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
69. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48 (declaring that "'[a]bsent explicit statutory language,'
this Court accordingly has refused to find that Congress has abrogated Indian treaty rights" and
explaining the requirement of "plain and unambiguous" title extinguishment) (citation omitted).
70. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 7 (footnote omitted).
71. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
72. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937) (quoting United States v.
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935)). This idea also has antecedents in the seminal early
Indian case law. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 588 (M'Lean, J., concurring) (stating that
"[nleither Georgia, nor the United States ... contemplated that force should be used in the ex-
tinguishment of the Indian title; nor that it should be procured on terms that are not reasonable").
73. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980).
74. Three Affiliated Tribes v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (quoted by
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 409).
75. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamnooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946) (plurality opinion)).
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The Court has suggested, further, that there might be some limit on
Congress's ability to enact legislation controlling Indian affairs such that legis-
lation "beyond what is reasonably essential to [the tribes'] protection" will be
disallowed.76 Legislative decisions regarding what is in the best interest of
Indians will ordinarily not be second-guessed, but they may be questioned if
"the special treatment [cannot] be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians."" Thus, this "tied rational-
ly" standard suggests that the government's trust responsibility toward the
tribes places some substantive limit on federal authorities' otherwise plenary
power to regulate Indian affairs.78
Apart from the Fifth Amendment obligation to give just compensation for
tribal lands appropriated by legislative fiat,79 it is not entirely clear what this
theoretical substantive limit actually means. Traditionally, "[pilenary authority
over the tribal relations ... has been exercised by Congress ... and [this]
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by
the judicial department of the government...... Although it is presumed Con-
gress will exercise its powers in good faith,8 this old view held that in the
event of congressional bad faith, relief had to be "sought by an appeal to that
body ... and not to the courts."82 The "tied rationally" standard would in-
deed seem to represent a modification of this doctrine, but although the execu-
tive branch "has sometimes been subjected to ... enforcement of its trust
responsibilities" in the administration of Indian affairs entrusted to it by Con-
gress,83 courts have been extremely reluctant actually to impose the fiduciary
duties of which they have sometimes spoken.84 This led one commentator to
conclude, for example, that "[i]n the case of Congress, then, the duty is essen-
tially a moral or political obligation."85 Moreover, even if invoked, the more
modem "tied rationally" standard seems to mean no more than the "rational
basis test" of ordinary equal protection jurisprudence: a test conspicuous for
the ease with which enactments survive its scrutiny. 6
76. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914).
77. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); see also Delaware Tribal, 430 U.S. at 85
(using the "tied rationally" standard of review for special treatment).
78. COHEN, supra note 67, at 221. As the Supreme Court has said, after all, the protective
relationship of the federal government with the Indian tribes "necessarily implies" a duty to en-
courage "among the arts of civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all these arrangements
to introduce and naturalize among [the Indians]," tribal "self-government, the regulation by them-
selves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own mem-
bers by the administration of their own laws and customs." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,
568 (1883).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
80. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
81. Id. at 566.
82. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 414 (discussing the Lone Wolf doctrine).
83. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 33 (1981).
84. Id. ("While it has been stated on several occasions that Congress owes a fiduciary duty
to the tribes, no court has ever enforced such a duty.").
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1991)
(noting that statutes subjected to rational basis review "are usually upheld"); id. at 538 ("[T]he
judicial application of the rationality test has generally ... led to validation of statutory classifica-
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Nevertheless, it is at least theoretically true that the federal government's
trust or guardian relationship with the Indian tribes imposes some substantive
limit upon the plenary power of federal law to regulate Indian affairs. Even
less well understood is how the underlying foundational doctrine of tribal
sovereignty ensures that the extent to which the exercise of any federal Indian
powers must be predicated upon the existence of a government-to-government
relationship between the United States and a recognized Indian tribe.
C. The Importance of Intergovernmental Relations
It has long been accepted as a fundamental component of Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence that most statutory racial classifications are strongly
suspect and must therefore be subjected to the most rigid constitutional scruti-
ny," a test which leaves laws stricken in its wake with the same frequency
that rational basis analysis upholds them.88 Since it is not just race-specific
classifications disadvantaging a particular racial group that are to some degree
suspect but all race-based classifications, federal Indian law flirts with race-
specific legislation at its peril. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena89 makes clear that all laws based on race
are now subject to "strict" scrutiny. Though the Court has emphasized that
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause need not invariably be fatal
to a race-based classification, 9 equal protection challenges to Indian-
classificatory statutes would present grave challenges. It would be difficult to
demonstrate that all, or even most, of the vast corpus of federal Indian law is
sufficiently narrowly-tailored to meet strict scrutiny standards.
It has so far been possible to avoid such equal protection concerns in
Indian law by pointing to the "political" character of Indian identity within the
venerable tradition of tribal sovereignty.9' Indeed, this is what the Supreme
Court did in Morton v. Mancari,92 when faced with a challenge to a series of
employment preferences for Indians, adopted by the Bureau for Indian Affairs.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found this preference to be permissi-
tions.").
87. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect ... [and]
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny"). Even laws which merely have a "disparate
impact" upon a particular racial group may be challenged. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (permitting prima facie case of employment discrimination to be shown by
statistical evidence that employment practice had a disproportionately adverse impact upon par-
ticular racial group irrespective of discriminatory intent). In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has required an increasingly detailed "factual predicate" in order to substantiate allegations
of discriminatory impact. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-52
(1989) (finding statistical evidence alone insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact).
88. In fact, Korematsu "is frequently said to mark the last occasion on which the Supreme
Court has upheld a race-specific statute disadvantaging a racial minority." STONE ET AL., supra
note 86, at 572.
89. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
90. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
91. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1263-67 (1994).
92. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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ble in part because the designation of "Indian" was a political classification
rather than a dangerously suspect racial one: "The preference is not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to
members of 'federally-recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many indi-
viduals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the prefer-
ence is political rather than racial in nature."93 Thus, "[t]he status of Indian
tribes as quasi-independent entities .. . has allowed Indian case law to escape
both constitutional 'strict scrutiny' and many of the conceptual ambiguities"
that result from the problematic objective character of racial identity.94
The distinctive character of Indian law derives from this political dimen-
sion, from the fact that the federal-tribal relationship has for the better part of
two centuries been considered a relationship between sovereigns. Indeed, our
present body of Indian law would not make sense if viewed through a solely
racial prism, and would be neither doctrinally justifiable nor constitutionally
sustainable.
A principled adherence to the "domestic dependent nation" theory of
Indian jurisprudence would thus appear to be vital to federal Indian law. Given
the extent to which federal Indian legislation and case law throughout this
country's history have been built upon stereotyped and often racist notions of
indelibly "Indian" characteristics," a real effort to apply the Supreme Court's
previous intermediate scrutiny standard for race classifications96  would
93. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) preference was also
found to be properly within Congress's power to regulate Indian affairs and appropriately related
to the legislative intent "to promote economic and political self-determination for the Indian." Id.
at 543 n. 15.
Within the present system of federal tribal "acknowledgment" pursuant to administrative
regulation, tribal membership largely follows Mancari and defines a tribe member as:
an individual who meets the membership requirements of the tribe as set forth in its
governing document or, absent such a document, has been recognized as a member
collectively by those persons comprising the tribal governing body, and has consistently
maintained tribal relations with the tribe or is listed on the tribal rolls of that tribe as a
member, if such rolls are kept.
25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1995).
94. Ford, supra note 91, at 1265.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926) (upholding congres-
sional intent to designate Pueblo Indians a "tribe" because "[allthough sedentary, industrious, and
disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government, always have lived
in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelli-
gence and greed of other races"); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (describing
federal guardianship role over Indians as being rooted in their "isolated and communal life, primi-
tive customs and limited civilization").
96. Before Adarand, a plurality of the Supreme Court had for some years felt that the stan-
dard for review of race classification under the Equal Protection Clause was that of "strict scruti-
ny" even for benign classifications. See Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For a time, however, the Court appeared to
endorse a two-tiered scheme of equal protection review-with state and local race classifications
reviewed "strictly" and Congressional enactments viewed with only "intermediate" scrutiny. In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 548 (1990), over-
ruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), for example, a majority of
the Court held that "[blenign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress" were permissible if
"they serve important governmental objectives." State and local classifications were permissible,
however, only if they could survive strict scrutiny. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520.
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undoubtedly prove unsettling.
In the wake of Adarand, the "political" status of Indian classifications
may be the only component capable of sustaining much of Indian law in the
face of post-Adarand equal protection challenges.9 7 Ultimately, the basic doc-
trines of federal Indian jurisprudence suggest that the sole basis of Indian law
must be a political one: the case law gives no intelligible support for, and the
underlying principles of tribal sovereignty do not permit, a federal-Indian
relationship based upon anything other than a political foundation.
D. The Centrality of Tribal Recognition
1. The Problematic Nature of Non-Political Indian Status
Ethnologically speaking, the "real" existence of a distinct "tribe" seems to
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of legally-recognized "tribal"
status. Federal policy toward the recognition of Indian tribes has been by no
means consistent with "real" ethnological principles: Congress has frequently
consolidated previously distinct groups into a single tribe for recognition pur-
poses, or has divided an individual tribe into two or more groups, recognizing
each in turn as a "different" Indian "nation." '98 Congress has also occasionally
"terminated" tribes' federal recognition," in some cases only to "restore" it
thereafter,"°° and has given the Secretary of the Interior the authority to
adjust tribal membership rolls at his own discretion.' °2
As one commentator has observed, "[iut is apparent that the question of
whether a tribe has been recognized is resolved without reference to the factu-
al, ethnological characteristics, at the time of decision, of the Indian group
97. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Adarand, apparently recognized the dangers strict scrutiny
posed to Indian law. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 6 (giving examples of such "consolidations" and divi-
sions).
99. In 1953, hoping to bring about the gradual cultural assimilation of American Indians,
Congress adopted a policy of seeking the progressive "termination" of many Indian groups' "trib-
al" status. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (enacted).
Such statutory "termination" was to end these groups' special relationship with the federal govern-
ment, and subject Indians and Indian lands to state jurisdiction. Between 1954 and 1964, 14 acts
were passed in this respect, leading to the revocation of federally-recognized tribal status for 109
Indian tribes and bands, prominent among them the Klamath of Oregon and the Menominee of
Wisconsin. All in all, between 1955 and 1970, termination affected 3.2% of all federally-recog-
nized Indians and a similar proportion of Indian trust land. This congressional termination policy
was abandoned in the late 1960s. See generally CANBY, supra note 83, at 25-28, 50; and
DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 24-25, 34.
100. The Menominee, for example, were restored to federally-recognized "tribal" status by
Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988)). Many statu-
tory "terminations" were ultimately repealed, but as of 1993 some 40 Indian groups have not had
their status restored. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 34.
101. See 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (1988) (giving the Secretary of the Interior the power of "supervi-
sion of public business relating to ... Indians").
102. See, e.g., Stookey v. Wilbur, 58 F.2d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (upholding the power of
the Secretary to correct membership rolls for "fraud" by refusing to enroll children and grandchil-
dren of member/non-member marriages into Gros Ventre tribe); United States ex rel. West v.
Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80, 85 (1907) (permitting Secretary of the Interior to disallow involvement in
Indian land transaction of white man accepted through marriage into Wichita tribe on grounds that
man was not really tribal member).
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involved."" 3 To suppose, in such an environment, that Chief Justice
Marshall's doctrine of tribal sovereignty invariably connects contemporary fed-
erally-recognized tribal governments by some historical umbilical cord to the
actual pre-discovery "independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the
sovereigns of their respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners
and proprietors of the soil '" 4 is to strain credulity. The only defensible prin-
cipled approach to tribal recognition is to acknowledge that there is no such
clear principle: the matter is indeed a political one, quite resistant to jurispru-
dential assessment.
The courts have, from time to time, hinted that there might be some sub-
stantive limit upon federal authority to recognize groups of Indians as tribal
political "sovereigns" capable of existing in the sort of intergovernmental
relationship with the United States that lies at the core of Indian law. As long
ago as 1832, Justice M'Lean, concurring in Worcester v. Georgia, asked "is
there no end to the exercise of this [recognition] power over Indians within the
limits of a state, by the general government?" '' According to Justice
M'Lean the limit of this principle was that "in its nature, it must be limited by
circumstances.""
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers,
as to lose the power of self-government, the protection of the local
[state] law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The point at
which this exercise of power by a state would be proper, need not
now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question." 7
Just over 80 years later, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sandoval"°8 suggested, in dicta, that this might indeed be "a judicial ques-
tion." In finding that the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico could be regulated as
an Indian tribe pursuant to the enabling legislation which authorized New
Mexico's entry into the Union, the Court did not stop upon finding a sort of
de facto federal recognition resulting from the Pueblos' treatment by the Presi-
dent and Congress as "dependent communities entitled to [United States] aid
and protection, like other Indian tribes."" Rather, the Court undertook an
independent examination into the "Indian-ness" of the Pueblo groups:
"[C]onsidering their Indian lineage," and their "isolated and communal life,
primitive customs and limited civilization, this assertion of guardianship over
them cannot be said to be arbitrary but must be regarded as both authorized
and controlling. ' " o
103. L.R. Weatherhead, What Is an "Indian Tribe"?-The Question of Tribal Existence, 8
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8 (1980).
104. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545 (1823).
105. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832) (M'Lean, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
109. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 47.
110. Id.
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The Sandoval Court apparently claimed for itself the authority and ability
to review the tribal-recognition determinations made by the political branches.
Though conceding to federal authorities a general right to determine matters of
tribal recognition, it added that:
it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body
of people within the range of [the Indian affairs] power by arbitrarily
calling them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly
Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for
what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes
requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States are to
be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.'
Federal recognition of groups not "distinctly Indian" in the judgment of
the Court, therefore, might be rejected. This odd and arguably racist"2 theme
was obliquely endorsed a half-century later, when Sandoval was discussed as
an example of the Supreme Court's flexible "political question" jurisprudence
in Baker v. Carr."3 "Able to discern what is 'distinctly Indian,"' wrote Jus-
tice William Brennan in Baker, "the courts will strike down any heedless
extension of that label. They will not stand impotent before an obvious in-
stance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power."'' Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, given the stereotyped cognitive baggage carried by the pregnant
dictum in the Sandoval decision, the Court has never attempted further to
explain this "arbitrariness" standard." 5 In fact, "there is no case in which a
congressional judgment or enactment [regarding tribal recognition] has been
overturned on the basis of [these] limitations.""' 6 Nevertheless, Sandoval
lurks ambiguously behind the otherwise political core of Indian recognition
law.
2. Ambiguities of Recognition
The statutes and case law on the import of formal political recognition of
Indian tribal status is remarkably varied. Even though, in theory, the special
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes depends
entirely upon recognized status, the courts have declared that even statutory
termination does not always end all of the federal relationship. Terminated
111. Id. at 46.
112. See supra text accompanying note 110. Twelve years after Sandoval, in United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926), the Supreme Court reiterated its power to decide what was "dis-
tinctly Indian," stating, again of the Pueblos:
While there is no express reference in the [federal statute at issue] to Pueblo Indians, we
think it must be taken as including them. They are plainly within its spirit, and, in our
opinion, fairly within it words, 'any tribe of Indians.' Although sedentary, industrious,
and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government,
always have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-
prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.
Id. at 441-42.
113. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
114. Baker, 369 U.S. at 216-17 (citation omitted).
115. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 5.
116. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 4.
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tribes may, for example, sometimes retain the capacity collectively to contract,
receive grants, exercise traditional hunting and fishing rights, and sue in
court." 7 The canons of construction peculiar to federal Indian jurispru-
dence"' appear somewhat to limit the impact of most termination statutes: a
congressional enactment can completely end all tribal rights," 9 but only if it
is "clear and specific" in this respect. 2
As to which groups may be considered Indian tribes under the law of the
United States, the courts have seldom limited the exercise of federal Indian
affairs powers to the formally recognized tribal status of Indian groups. Where
formal recognition has not been forthcoming, courts have tried to develop
factual standards for judging tribal existence: "The absence of federal recogni-
tion ... is not dispositive where no contrary statutory requirement exists, and
in such situations courts have developed broad criteria to make determinations
of tribal status."' 2 "[W]hile Congress' power to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes includes authority to decide when and to what extent it shall
recognize a particular Indian community as a dependent tribe under its guard-
ianship, Congress is not prevented from legislating as to tribes general-
ly .... ,22 The Supreme Court, for example, has professed to understand the
117. COHEN, supra note 67, at 19. The "terminated" Klamath tribe, for example, was found
still to possess hunting, fishing, and trapping rights on their ancestral lands, Kimball v. Callahan,
590 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1979), while the Menominee were found to retain beneficial and
equitable interests in certain properties, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1001
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
119. It has long been accepted that "[it rests with Congress to determine the time and extent
of emancipation" from the guardianship status of federal-tribal relations. United States v. Waller,
243 U.S. 452, 459 (1917); see also Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 392 (1921) (holding that
"[tihe guardianship [over Indians] arises from their condition of tutelage or dependency; and it
rests with Congress to determine when the relationship shall cease"). Even United States v.
Sandoval, which first suggested the idea of an "arbitrariness" limit upon the federal tribal-recogni-
tion power, admitted that it was the prerogative of Congress to decide when Indian tutelage had
come to an end. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 110.
120. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1297 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting
COHEN, supra note 67, at 815); see also id. at 1298-99 (noting that treaty-given rights of occu-
pancy persist until clearly abrogated by Congress); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d
998, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (suggesting that tribe might have lost standing to sue had not termination
act contemplated that tribe would continue to remain in existence for such purposes); COHEN,
supra note 67, at 19 ("[A] terminated tribe retains all 'sovereign authority' not inconsistent with a
termination act .... ).
121. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 32-33 (footnote omitted); see generally Weatherhead, su-
pra note 103, at 10-14.
122. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377 (lst Cir.
1975) (footnote and citations omitted). Examples of a "general" Indian enactment include the
Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988), and the Snydar Act, 22 U.S.C. §
13, 42 Stat. 208 (1988) (giving certain benefits to "the Indians throughout the United States"),
which the Department of the Interior has interpreted to allow the Bureau of Indian Affairs to pro-
vide services to Indians of any degree, whether or not members of a recognized tribe. See
Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 4. It should be noted, however, that courts have found claims by
individual Indians under the Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act to be impermissible. See, e.g.,
Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (rejecting claims by individual
descendants of the Chappaquiddick tribe because "plaintiffs are not suing as a tribe [and] have
failed to allege tribal status").
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word "tribe" to mean no more than "a body of Indians of the same or a simi-
lar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory,"'23 and courts
have on occasion allowed Indian legislation to apply to "a bona fide tribe not
otherwise federally recognized."' 24
For federal purposes, therefore, "[t]he term tribe has no universal legal
definition," and "the question of tribal existence ... [may] depend in part on
the context and purposes for which the term is used."'2 5 As a result,
tribes cannot be neatly divided into "recognized" and
"nonrecognized" tribes for all purposes; rather, a tribe may "exist" for
some purposes but not for others .... The legal principles developed
under one statutory scheme often cannot be transferred to other situa-
tions because of the peculiar context in which the original principles
were developed.'26
These standards have produced a complex, and often confusing body of case
law of Indian tribal status.
Does the variety of statutory provisions and case law regarding tribal
recognition mean that federal Indian jurisprudence has abandoned its animat-
ing principles of tribal sovereignty and the political character of federal-Indian
relations? If the courts were ready to attempt to develop a Sandoval-style law
of genuine Indian identity, and if congressional Indian legislation really could
reach Indians irrespective of tribal recognition, it might represent a significant
departure from Indian law's political core. As the discussion above suggests,
our legislature and courts have flirted with such an approach, particularly with
respect to the Indian racial status of individual persons.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, for example, defined "Indian" to
include not only members of recognized tribes but also "all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the
present boundaries of any Indian reservation," and even "all other persons of
one-half or more Indian blood."'27 In 1938, the Seventh Circuit found that
the percentage of Indian blood of a habeas corpus petitioner and "his racial
status in fact as an Indian" gave federal jurisdiction despite that individual's
lack of tribal membership.'28 The Supreme Court has noted that "enrollment
in an official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal
[Indian] jurisdiction."
'' 29
Such suggestions of a court's ability to determine the "real" racial identity
of an individual claimant, or of a statute's ability to define it in a
123. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
124. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 528 F.2d at 377.
125. COHEN, supra note 67, at 3.
126. Id. at 7.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988).
128. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939).
129. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 30 (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647
n.7 (1977)); see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1978) (recognizing that § 19 of
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988), does not necessarily require tribal enroll-
ment for "Indian" status).
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comprehensive way, are conceptually quite problematic in their own right, 3"
and are entirely inconsistent with the principles of tribal sovereignty repre-
sented by the line of cases proceeding from Johnson v. M'Intosh3' through
Morton v. Mancari.'32 Real flirtations with such a constitutionally "suspect"
racial essentialism cannot be reconciled with the principle that "the [federal]
power over Indians reaches only Indian tribes or tribal Indians""' since as
"[tihe Indian tribe is the fundamental unit of Indian Law, in its absence there
is no occasion for the law to operate."' 34
3. Returning to Political Recognition
At least some of the varied case law on tribal recognition, however, may
perhaps be understood in ways which make it less problematic. If tribal sover-
eignty is to remain the foundation of federal Indian jurisprudence, the courts
must insist that "Congress may not favor a group of individual Indians with
special legislation unless that group is found to constitute an Indian tribe for
purposes of federal Indian law.' 35 With respect to findings of the Indian
"tribal" status of Indian groups not formally recognized as such,'36 much of
this case law may amount less to a rejection of the recognition power than a
judicial willingness to accept "a course of dealing with the tribe as a political
entity"'' as a form of de facto federal recognition. Thus, for example, courts
have found Indian "tribes" to exist for federal Indian law purposes where the
political branches of government, even in the absence of formal tribal designa-
tion, have dealt with Indian groups as if they were such tribes.' Reading
such cases as examples of de facto federal recognition rather than as assess-
ments of "real" racial or ethnological identity keeps federal Indian law faithful
130. See Ford, supra note 91, at 1239-40, 1280-85.
131. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
132. 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 30 ("Although Mancari and
related decisions could be construed as requiring an opposite result, lower federal and state courts
have traditionally not required actual tribal membership, in the absence of a statutory directive, as
a condition of Indian status.").
133. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 3.
134. CANBY, supra note 83, at 3; see also COHEN, supra note 67, at 1 ("Indian law is found-
ed in the political relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. In most instances, the
ights and obligations of individual Indians peculiar to Indian law derive from their status as mem-
bers or descendants of an Indian tribe, not solely from their race.") (footnote omitted).
135. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 3.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
137. CANBY, supra note 83, at 4.
138. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (effectively reversing the holding
of United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 505 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1974), that Choctaw Indians
were not a tribe by finding long history of Choctaw relations with federal government as if group
were tribe); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (allowing Pueblo Indians to be con-
sidered Indian "tribe" by virtue of congressional provision in New Mexico statehood enabling
legislation that group's lands be considered Indian Country for purposes of federal ban on liquor
sales to Indians); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377-78
(1st Cir. 1975) (finding Passamaquoddies to be Indian tribe because group had long been dealt
with as if it were and "[nlo one in th[e] proceeding hatdl challenged the Tribe's identity as a
tribe").
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to its animating philosophy of tribal sovereignty, and allows it to avoid the
treacherous constitutional shoals of racial classification.
Fortunately, federal recognition policy is becoming more consistent on
this score. In its more recent pieces of Indian legislation, Congress has avoid-
ed the use of any definition of tribe, preferring instead to tie statutory provi-
sions to the acknowledgment of tribal status by the Secretary of the Interi-
or 39-- with "tribe" being defined in the legislation only as a group recog-
nized as eligible due to its status as an Indian tribe."4 Today, tribal recogni-
tion is "treated more fully as a conferral of a legal status" than was the case in
previous eras. 4 ' Perhaps, therefore, federal Indian law is returning to the
principles of tribal sovereignty and political relationships that lie at its core,
make it coherent, and help it to avoid the quagmires of equal protection analy-
sis.
4. Recognition and the Architecture of Federal Indian Power
Recognition by the political branches of government, either express or
implied, continues to lie at the center of federal Indian law, forming the exclu-
sive basis by which this peculiar body of American jurisprudence may be
invoked. This understanding of the recognition power has significant conse-
quences. There may well be substantive limits upon what the federal govern-
ment may do in its regulation of Indian affairs. For example, Indian lands may
not be taken by the United States government without the provision of just
compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.'42 The trust responsibility attached to the government's role as guardian
of the Indian tribes and protector of their interests may also entail some sub-
stantive limits upon federal authority to regulate Indian affairs at discre-
tion."'43
Yet there would seem to be no check upon the ability of the political
branches of the United States government to recognize, or to de-recognize,
Indian tribes.'" If a tribe's status as a "sovereign" power with the ability to
exist in a government-to-government relationship with the United States is
fundamentally a political status, then the federal power of tribal recognition
must, as with the recognition power of the President in foreign affairs,'45
139. See supra text accompanying notes 3-16.
140. See Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 1, 8, 14-15 (giving examples of such legislation).
141. Id. at 17.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
144. Cf The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) (noting the power of federal govern-
ment to refuse recognition to foreign sovereigns).
145. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, de
jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which
by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as
well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government."). In Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), the Court held:
What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is
a political rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined by the political depart-
ment of the government. Objections to its determination as well as to the underlying
policy are to be addressed to it and not to the courts. Its action in recognizing a foreign
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remain a political status not subject to judicial review. This was recognized
more than a century ago by the Supreme Court which stated that
it is the rule of this [C]ourt to follow the action of the executive and
other political departments of the government, whose more special
duty it is to determine such affairs. If by them [certain] Indians are
recognized as a tribe, this court must do the same. If they are a tribe
of Indians, then, by the Constitution of the United States, they are
placed, for certain purposes, within the control of the laws of Con-
gress. ",6
While courts may be able to place limits upon the exercise of federal power
over the affairs of Indian tribes, the initial decision of federal authorities as to
the recognition of Indian tribes, a powerful antecedent power, is a non-justicia-
ble political matter.
This result is entirely consistent with the scope of the recognition power
as the Supreme Court has understood it in the context of federal dealings with
foreign sovereigns. As Justice Brennan stated in the seminal political question
decision of Baker v. Carr:
While recognition of foreign governments so strongly defies
judicial treatment that without executive recognition a foreign state
has been called "a republic of whose existence we know nothing,"
and the judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation
has sovereignty over disputed territory, once sovereignty over an area
is politically determined and declared, courts may examine the result-
ing status and decide independently whether a statute applies to that
area. 
47
The politically constrained power of the government to recognize Indian tribes
is also consistent with the discretion of the political branches of the federal
government to make and unmake treaties not only with foreign sovereigns,
4
8
government and in receiving [that government's] diplomatic representatives is conclusive
on all domestic courts, which are bound to accept that determination ....
Id. at 137-38; see also Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419 (1839) (noting that
insistence by the United States government that the Falkland Islands are not Argentine "is bind-
ing ... on [the Circuit] Court, as to whom the sovereignty of those islands belongs"); United
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149 (1820) (referring to non-recognized "Mexican
Republic" as "a republic of whose existence we know nothing"); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (declaring that recognition questions "are generally rather [morel
political than legal in their character" and "belong more properly" to political branches); KMW
Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "[a]lthough there
has been a change of government in Iran, the United States has "recognized the present govern-
ment" so as to give governmental agency power to enforce its rights in U.S. courts).
146. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865). The Court in Holliday had been
faced with a dispute arising out of an 1862 statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to any Indians
under the supervision of a federal Indian agent. The act was found permissible on the grounds that
it did indeed regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes" as allowed by the Constitution. See id. at
417.
147. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (declaring that where government action purports to
have ended international agreement, "a court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been
terminated, since on that question 'governmental action ... must be regarded as of controlling
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but also with Indians, 49 and to refuse recognition to foreign governments"'
and terminate the federal-tribal relationship. 5'
Given, therefore, that the federal government's power of tribal recognition
is so powerful and so potentially unconstrained, it becomes quite important to
determine who may constitutionally exercise it.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS POWERS
The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that "[tihe Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'52 It
has generally been interpreted to give Congress plenary power to regulate
Indian affairs.'53 This power, which replicates a similar but somewhat more
specific allocation of authority that existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, "'54 is extraordinarily broad and includes the power to "limit, modify or
eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess."'55 The treaty-making power vested in the President and the
importance"'); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (declaring that presidential
acceptance of facial validity of Spanish legal position in 1821 treaty could not be second-guessed
by judiciary).
149. Federal power to abrogate Indian treaties is both "political" and nonjusticiable. Delaware
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). The Court declared that while
[u]nquestionably a treaty [with Indians] may be modified or abrogated by an act of Con-
gress ... the power to make and unmake is essentially political and not judicial, and the
presumption is wholly inadmissible that Congress sought in this instance to submit the
good faith of its own action or the action of the government to judicial decision ....
United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 468 (1893); see also United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371, 411 n.27 (1980) (citing cases in accord); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S.
584, 594 (1977); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 30 (1831) (Johnson, J., dissent
ing) (noting that "as between sovereigns, breaches of treaty [are] not breaches of contract cogni-
zable in a court of justice.... [Flor their political acts states [are] not amenable to tribunals of
justice."); cf Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1856) (refusing to second-guess
propriety of Indian treaty since "the treaty, after [being] executed and ratified by the proper au-
thorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go
behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation, than they can behind an act of
Congress"). The Court stated in a later case, however, that
[t]he power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably
such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify
the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
150. See, e.g., The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) ("A policy of nonrecognition
when demonstrated by the Executive must be deemed to be as affirmative and positive in effect as
a policy of recognition.").
151. See, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1921); United States v. Waller, 243
U.S. 452, 459-60 (1917); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). As we have seen,
termination of the federal-tribal "special relationship" is constrained merely by a "clear statement"
rule that requires congressional intent to be express. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
153. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
154. See U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4 (giving Congress "the sole and exclusive right
and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not in-
fringed or violated"), superseded by U.S. CONST.
155. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
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advisory role granted to the Senate 5 6 is also commonly discussed as a prin-
cipal component of the federal government's constitutional authority over
Indian affairs.
Curiously, no commentators have identified the independent presidential
prerogative of tribal recognition visible in the Constitution's allocation of
Indian authority. In addressing the constitutional bases of the federal
government's Indian affairs powers, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indi-
an Law'57-"[t]he authoritative commentary" on United States Indian
law"'S--only discusses the Indian Commerce Clause, the treaty power,'59
the Property Clause,"6 Congress's power to regulate the terms of a new
state's accession, 6' and such "Congressional powers of lesser importance
156. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .. ").
157. COHEN, supra note 67.
158. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1297 (4th Cir. 1983).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2. Interestingly, the Second Circuit in Oneida believed that
under the Articles of Confederation, "Congress's power to make Indian treaties" derived not from
the ordinary confederal treaty power but from the Articles' analogue to the modem-day Indian
Commerce Clause. See Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1155. This, the court concluded, was apparent from
the fact that Indian treaties such as the Treaty of Fort Stanwix became effective upon signature
and were not submitted for formal ratification pursuant to U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 6
(barring United States from entering into "any treaties or alliances ... unless nine States assent to
the same"). Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1154. Under such a system, therefore, the Indian treaty power
presumably derived not from the government's ordinary (foreign affairs) treaty-negotiation authori-
ty but simply by delegation from the legislature's general power to "manag[e] all affairs with the
Indians." U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4.
This constitutional connection between the Indian treaty power and the Indian Commerce
Clause did not survive the adoption of the Constitution in 1787: with the establishment of an
executive presidency, the power to make treaties-both with Indians and with foreign pow-
ers-moved to that branch. See DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 1 ("For much of the first century of
the Nation's history, this [congressional] lawmaking power [in Indian affairs] was augmented by
exercise of presidential treaty-making authority under Article II, section 2 [of the Constitution].");
see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (noting that "Indian law"
has "draw[n] principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive Branch and legis-
lation passed by Congress". One case noted that
being within the territorial limits of the United States, [Indian tribes] were not, strictly
speaking foreign states; but they were alien nations, distinct political communities, with
whom the United States might and habitually did deal . .. either through treaties made
by the President and Senate, or through acts of Congress in the ordinary forms of legis-
lation.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) (emphasis added).
By 1868, over 400 treaties had been made under presidential authority and ratified by the
Senate pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 13 (citing 2 C.
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES (1904) (collecting treaties between United
States and Indian tribes)). Indeed, even after Congress's ostensible "termination of Presidential
treaty-making authority, Congress routinely approved agreements negotiated by the Executive
Branch with tribes .... " DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 13.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States .... ").
161. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl.l (providing that "[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union").
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involved in Indian legislation" '62 as the power to establish post roads, 6 ' to
enact a uniform rule of naturalization,"6 and to set up judicial tribunals infe-
rior to the Supreme Court.'65 Despite its obvious importance for Indian af-
fairs in a legal system founded upon doctrines of tribal sovereignty and gov-
ernment-to-government relations, Cohen never says anything about constitu-
tional allocation of the vital recognition power."6
The possibility of some independent constitutional authority for the Presi-
dent in Indian affairs has not been entirely overlooked.'67 But no attention
has been focused upon the recognition power itself, despite the Constitution's
clear assignment to the President of the power not only to make treaties, but to
"appoint Ambassadors" to other sovereign powers with the Senate's con-
sent"6 and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" therefrom
entirely at his own discretion."6 Indeed, though it explicitly analogizes the
federal power to recognize tribal sovereignty to the "recognition of foreign
governments and to other issues of international relations,"'70 Cohen's au-
thoritative Handbook attributes the power of tribal recognition to the "Indian"
portion of the Commerce Clause itself. 7'
This article contends that such a view is mistaken, and that there is an
independent presidential power of tribal recognition in the Constitution's allo-
cation of Indian powers. The Indian Commerce Clause does not constitute an
exclusive vesting of authority over all Indian matters to the Congress. Rather,
as has been long recognized with respect to the power to make treaties with
Indian tribes, Indian affairs are within the realm of executive and legislative
powers in which responsibility is to some degree shared. The Constitution's
allocation of powers between the two political branches of government, and its
commitment of the general recognition power to the President, serves both to
reserve that power to the executive in matters of foreign relations and to guar-
antee his authority to recognize or de-recognize the sovereignty of a tribal
"domestic dependent nation."
162. COHEN, supra note 67, at 210 n.21.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
164. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
165. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. I11, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.").
166. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 207-12.
167. In 1871 Congress passed a statute, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988), which purported to bar any
further treaty-derived federal recognition of Indian tribes' sovereign status. William Canby has
noted that while it is questionable that Congress could limit the constitutional treaty-making power
of the President, the statute did effectively end the making of Indian treaties by serving as notice
that none would thereafter be ratified. Reservations established after 1871 were accordingly creat-
ed either by statue or, until Congress ended the practice in 1919, by executive order. CANBY,
supra note 83, at 17-18.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169. Id. art. II, § 3.
170. COHEN, supra note 67, at 3.
171. Id. (discussing how "[s]uch determinations are incident to the Indian Commerce Clause
of the Constitution"). The Handbook goes no further than to suggest that either "Congress or the
Executive [may find] that a tribe exists." Id.
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A. Congressional Power over Indians
The powers of the Congress over Indian affairs derive primarily from the
Commerce Clause authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'72 With this phrasing,
the Constitution carefully describes this "Commerce Power" as having three
distinct forms: the power to regulate foreign commerce, the power to regulate
interstate commerce, and the power to regulate Indian commerce. It is impor-
tant to understand that these three realms of congressional authority are not
equivalent in scope.
1. Interstate Commerce
The legislature's power over interstate commerce is the broadest of the
three. As any student of constitutional law knows, the Supreme Court has
given the Commerce Clause an increasingly expansive interpretation over the
years. Beginning as a comparatively modest mandate to regulate commercial
intercourse "which concerns more States than one,"'73 the clause became,
early in the present century, a bitterly-contested means by which the Court, for
a time, tried to rein-in the creation of the expansive modern administrative
state. "'74 In more recent times, the Commerce Clause has been held to permit
an ever-increasing scope for congressional regulation.7 Though the Supreme
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
173. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824).
174. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (finding no congressional
power to regulate "manufacturing" under antitrust law provisions of Sherman Act because merely
making product in particular state does not itself bear a "direct relation" to interstate commerce);
Houston, E. & W. Tx. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (allowing Interstate Com-
merce Commission to regulate railroad rates on intrastate route because matter "ha[d] such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the...
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms");
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (striking down anti-child-labor law on
grounds that act did not "regulate transportation among the States" but rather aimed to "standard-
ize the ages at which children may be employed" while "the goods shipped are of themselves
harmless"); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (allowing regulation of stockyards
because they were "but a throat through which the current [of interstate commerce] flows, and the
transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current"); Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (allowing regulation of coal mining on grounds that while
"[tihe acts of the persons involved [in labor unrest] were local in character, but the intent was to
restrain interstate commerce and the means employed were calculated to carry that intent into
effect"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935) (rejecting
regulation of poultry slaughterhouses since "[nleither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants
were transactions in interstate commerce").
175. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (upholding
labor legislation in steel industry on grounds denial of employee rights to organize unions threat-
ens industrial peace and that "the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would have a
most serious effect upon interstate commerce"); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (per-
mitting Congress to bar interstate shipments of goods produced by substandard labor practices);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (upholding legislation prohibiting "extortionate
credit transactions" by deferring to purported congressional finding that such activities help fuel
organized crime activity and thus "affect interstate commerce").
Most famously, perhaps, it has even been invoked in support of federal legislation banning
racial discrimination by privately-owned motels and restaurants-on the grounds that their clien-
tele included some interstate travelers. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
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Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez176 demonstrates that the
power to regulate "Commerce . . . among the several States" is not unlimited,
it is clearly enormously broad, giving the legislature sweeping authority in
matters pertaining to domestic relations.
2. Foreign Commerce
In foreign affairs, by contrast, the Constitution affords the President con-
siderable power, assigning him not only the role of Commander-in-Chief,'
but also the power to negotiate treaties (though their entry into effect requires
Senatorial approval),"' to appoint United States ambassadors and other min-
isters (also with Senatorial approval),'79 and to receive ambassadors from
other governments.50 Congress is hardly powerless in this equation, possess-
ing the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 8' establish uni-
form rules of naturalization,'82 define and punish crimes on the high seas and
against international law, 8 ' declare war, 8 4 and raise and maintain the
country's military forces.'85
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made it clear in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. 6 that the conduct of foreign relations is fundamentally
the prerogative of the Chief Executive. The federal government succeeded
directly to the plenary foreign affairs powers of the British Crown, and the
President is the embodiment of that power under our present constitutional
system.S7
U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding anti-discrimination provisions of Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because the motel "serve[d] interstate travelers"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (upholding Title II provisions because restaurant "either serves or offers to serve inter-
state travelers or serves food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce").
176. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
177. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
178. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 1I, § 3.
181. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
182. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
183. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
184. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
185. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
186. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
187. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-17. As the Supreme Court has observed:
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not
have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source. During the Colonial period, those powers were
possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the [British] Crown....
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the
powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America
... Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of
Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.
Id.; see also id. at 317 (quoting Rufus King at Constitutional Convention, in 5 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOM-
MENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 212 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
New York, Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
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[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations ... does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress [though] of course, like every other governmental power,
[it] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution. 88
Not only is the federal power over foreign relations different in origin and
character than the power over domestic affairs, but congressional "participation
in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm,
with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."'89
The jurisprudential architecture of the foreign affairs power is therefore
quite different from the power over domestic affairs. As a result, the congres-
sional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" is necessarily a
narrower grant of power than that afforded to "regulate Commerce ... among
the several States." In the former, the legislature's discretion to set federal
policy at its discretion is much more powerfully qualified by the independent
authority of the executive than is the case in the domestic arena. Based on the
Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright, it would appear that in foreign relations,
Congress's authority is limited to those matters specifically assigned to the
legislature by the Constitution-in contrast to the powers of the Executive
Branch, for which the specific Constitutional enumerations are merely illus-
trative.
Where the interstate provisions of the Commerce Clause provide an ex-
pansive power of oversight and regulation in domestic affairs, therefore, the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations seems rather narrowly to
mean only actual "commerce," that is, it confers the power to pass legislation
relating to United States commercial trading relations with other countries."
188. Id. at 320. Moreover, the Court suggested because of its extra-constitutional derivation,
the foreign affairs power is not in principle limited to the powers allocated amongst the branches
of government by our Constitution. Id. "The broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs." Id. at 315-16.
[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with
other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
Id. at 318.
189. Id. at 319.
190. For example, Congress has assumed a supervisory role over trade agreements with for-
eign powers. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, for example, were negotiated
by the President pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988 & Supp. V 1992), which authorized him to
enter into agreements to reduce tariff barriers, id. § 2902(a)(1)(A), agreements to reduce non-tariff
barriers, id. § 2902(b)(1), and bilateral agreements to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers, id.
§ 2902(c)(1). Under these provisions, moreover, before the President could sign agreements relat-
ing to non-tariff barriers, he was required to consult with the various congressional committees
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With respect to broader questions of United States policy in the international
arena, Curtiss-Wright makes clear that it is the President who enjoys the upper
hand.
191
3. Indian Commerce: Neither Fish nor Fowl
The distinct separation of the enumerated legislative powers of the Com-
merce Clause marks the power to regulate Commerce with the Indian Tribes a
distinct category, consisting neither of relations with "foreign Nations" nor of
domestic affairs regulable by virtue of being related to interstate com-
merce.' As Chief Justice Marshall's "domestic dependent nations" formula-
tion '9 suggests, this is entirely consistent with the principles of tribal sover-
eignty underlying federal Indian law. Indian tribes are not states for purposes
of the Interstate Commerce Clause,' 94 and indeed are clearly not states at
all. "'95 Nor, are Indian tribes foreign states within the meaning of the Consti-
tution. 96 Even though separate sovereigns, they are "admitted to compose a
charged with the oversight of federal policies likely to be affected by such international arrange-
ments. Id. § 2902(d)(1). The GATT's Uruguay Round fell under the provisions of §2902 (b)(1),
while NAFTA began as a bilateral agreement with Canada pursuant to § 2902(c)(1) and was sub-
sequently extended, through bilateral negotiations, to Mexico (thus apparently keeping it within §
2902(c)(1)).
191. This is not to say, however, that the legislature's role has been insignificant, since by the
exercise of its enumerated constitutional powers it can still influence the conduct of foreign rela-
tions in significant ways. The congressional power over the purse strings of the federal govern-
ment, for example, can be considerable. It has thus been said that:
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority not only to designate the
purpose of appropriation, but also the terms and conditions under which the executive
department ... may expend such appropriations.... [This matter is] solely in the hands
of Congress and it is the plain and explicit duty of the executive branch . . . to comply
with the same.
Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft, Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), affld, 154 F.2d 419
(9th Cir. 1946). Congress has thus "often used its defense appropriations power to control national
security policy, particularly since World War Il." STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 107 (1990). This power of conditional appropriations may itself not be without limit. See,
e.g., 41 Op. ATI'Y GEN. 507 (1960) (arguing that appropriations power cannot be exercised to in-
validate direct constitutional commitment of power to other branches); 41 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 230
(1955) (same); 4 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 731 (1980) (same). Nevertheless, it has, for example,
proven significant in precipitating the "Iran-Contra" scandal by banning the expenditure of federal
funds "for the purpose ... of supporting ... military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua,"
Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984) (the
"Boland Amendment"), and in providing an important legislative means of pressuring the Presi-
dent to abandon overseas military operations. See generally Christopher A. Ford, War Powers As
We Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 633, 692, 699 (1995).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163, 192 (1989) ("The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce
Clause ... is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our consti-
tutional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause.").
193. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
194. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989).
195. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see, e.g., Cotton
Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191-93 (finding that tribes are not "states" for purposes of tax apportion-
ment); Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958)).
196. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18; see generally Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1154 (tracing
status of Indian tribes under Articles of Confederation and United States Constitution).
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part of the United States, [and in United States dealings with foreign powers]
are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States."'97
Indian tribes are thus neither international fish nor domestic fowl. The
Indians "sustain a peculiar relation to the United States" ' which is unique.
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-inde-
pendent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sover-
eignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws
of the Union or of the state within whose limits they resided.' 99
Although the Supreme Court has used similar language in describing Indian
tribal sovereignty as that used to describe sovereignty in the international
arena,"' it is clear that the two categories are not the same."' As
197. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The Indian tribes, Chief Justice Marshall contin-
ued, are "so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt
[by foreign powers] to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered ... an act of hostility." Id. at 17-18.
Under international law, "[a]n entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own
constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political,
technical, and financial capabilities to do so." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. e (1990) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; cf
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (noting that United States government "is invested
with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of
nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."). In
this respect, ironically, the various states of the Union might be considered to be closer to the sta-
tus of a state under international law than are the Indian tribes: while tribes' foreign relations are
conducted exclusively through the federal government, states enjoy the ability to reach agreements
with foreign sovereigns as long as these arrangements to not "encroach ... upon the full and free
exercise of federal authority." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893). States are, howev-
er, barred from making actual treaties with foreign powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, or from "oth-
erwise engag[ing] in or intrud[ing] upon foreign relations to any substantial extent." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra, § 201 cmt. g.
198. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) (M'Lean, J., concurring). M'Lean
went on to note:
In the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government, we have admitted,
by the most solemn sanctions, the existence of the Indians as a separate and distinct
people, and as being vested with rights which constitute them a state, or separate com-
munity-not a foreign, but a domestic community-not as belonging to the confederacy,
but as existing within it, and, of necessity, bearing to it a peculiar relation.
Id. at 583.
199. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
200. The Worchester Court described Indian sovereignty by citing the international law writ-
ings of Vattel to the effect that
[a] weak state ... may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government . . . [and that] [tlributary and feudatory
states... "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self
government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the administration of the
state."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 197, § 201 cmt. e ("An entity that has the capacity to conduct foreign relations does not
cease to be a state because it voluntarily turns over to another state control of its foreign relations,
as in the 'protectorates' of the period of colonialism, the case of Liechtenstein, or the 'associated
states' of today."). Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall observed in Worcester that
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"extraconstitutional political bodies''2.. existing in a intergovernmental rela-
tionship with the United States, yet falling within United States jurisdiction
and a sweeping federal regulative power, Indian tribes exist as a distinct legal
category, between the foreign and domestic paradigms of legislative power.
The status of Indian tribes as a third category subject to congressional
commerce authority has significant implications. Chief Justice Marshall, for
example, wrote in Cherokee Nation, that "[tihe objects, to which the power of
regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct class-
es-foreign nations, the several states, and Indian tribes. When forming this
article, the [Constitutional] convention considered them as entirely dis-
tinct."203
This is true not solely with respect to the nature of Indian sovereignty, but
with respect to the powers of Congress itself. This long-understood constitu-
tional distinction between the three realms of interstate, foreign, and Indian
affairs underscores the conclusion that the legislature has different degrees of
power in each of these areas.2" Being neither clearly in the realm of foreign
relations nor in that of domestic affairs, Indian affairs have a constitutional
division of power all their own-and one which admits some independent role
for the executive branch.
B. The Distribution of Constitutional Power over Indian Affairs
Under the scheme articulated by the Court in Curtiss-Wright, the doctrinal
groundings of Indian tribal sovereignty would suggest a federal allocation of
powers more analagous to that of foreign relations, rather than that of domes-
tic affairs. For domestic matters, the "primary purpose of the Constitution was
to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the
states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal govern-
ment, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states."205 As
[t]he words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own language, selected in our diplo-
matic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well under-
stood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.
201. Justice Thompson, dissenting in Cherokee Nation, resisted this distinction. See Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 52-53 (Thompson, J., dissenting). As Justice Johnson discussed, Eu-
ropean law encompassed an array of sovereign and "demi-sovereign" states, but a Cherokee state,
"if it be a state, is still a grade below them all: for not to be able to alienate without permission of
the remainder-man or lord, places them in a state of feudal dependence." Id. at 26-27 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
202. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 1162.
203. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
204. Indeed, Justice M'Lean, concurring in Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 592, suggested that
the commerce power of Congress with respect to the Indian tribes might be more limited even
than the legislature's power over foreign commerce. While "[i]t is the same power, and is con-
ferred in the same words, that has often been exercised in regulating trade with foreign countries,"
he wrote, it was nonetheless true that "[i]n the regulation of commerce with the Indians, Congress
has exercised a more limited power than has been exercised in reference to foreign countries." Id.
205. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (emphasis in
original).
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Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Worcester, the power of the British
Crown, as discoverer and conqueror of the Indian nations, passed directly to
the United States as a whole-as in Justice Black's Curtiss-Wright opinion,
which described how the authority to conduct foreign relations passed to the
United States upon American independence.2"
While this theory underscores federal Indian-affairs supremacy vis-a-vis
the states, the mere fact that the power over Indian affairs was transmitted
from the British Crown to the federal government may not tell us everything
we need to know about the allocation of Indian powers within the federal
system. Precisely because an Indian tribe is not as foreign a sovereign as is,
say, France, the direct acquisition of authority from the Crown does not neces-
sarily imply the same overarching presidential power to "speak or listen as a
representative of the [United States]"2 8 in Indian affairs as it does in foreign
relations. To find the presidential supremacy of Curtiss-Wright implicit in
Indian affairs would be inconsistent with the distinction that has been drawn
between Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Saw-
yer,2" in which President Harry Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills
in order to prevent the disruption of armaments production by labor unrest
during the Korean War was found unconstitutional because the President's ac-
tion in Youngstown had a "profound and demonstrable domestic impact" while
the powers at issue in Curtiss-Wright had effects "entirely external" to the
United States.' The recognition of an Indian tribe and the adoption of fed-
eral legislation regulating Indian affairs, which has the effect under prevailing
tribal sovereignty principles of carving a federal enclave out of the reach of
most state law and regulatory powers,2 ' certainly does not have effects sole-
ly external to the United States.22
206. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) and Johnson v.
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936). At least one court has suggested that the system established by the
Articles of Confederation might perhaps have "redistributed some of these powers to the states."
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1161 n.10; cf U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4 (giving Congress "the
sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within
its own limits be not infringed or violated") (emphasis added). During the Confederal period the
states appear to have had at least some ability to purchase Indian land without federal approval.
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1160-61 ("We conclude that the ... power of Congress to manage Indian
Affairs [under the Articles of Confederation], as limited by the Legislative Rights Proviso, did not
preclude New York from making ... purchases of Oneida [tribal] land within its borders.").
207. See, e.g., Oneida, 470 U.S. at 234 (declaring that Indian relations are "the exclusive
province of federal law").
208. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
209. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
210. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring,
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, and Stevens, JJ.).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
212. The only court to address such a question said, with respect to the Articles of Confedera-
tion rather than with our present Constitution, that it had
considerable doubt whether the "international powers" discussed in Curtiss-Wright in-
cluded any authority with respect to Indians. The whole tenor of the [Supreme] Court's
discussion concerns international relations, the very matters that during the Confedera-
tion were the subject of the powers enumerated in Article IX(I) [of the Articles of Con-
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How, then, does the Constitution divide the power to regulate Indian
affairs? Despite the implicit assumptions of courts and commentators that the
Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power constitute the entirety of federal
power over Indian affairs,2 ' this article contends that by virtue of the status
of Indian relations as neither a fully domestic nor a fully international realm of
federal power, there exists at least some independent executive authority over
Indian affairs. Moreover, the necessarily political nature of federal relations
with the Indian tribes means that an independent presidential recognition pow-
er must be part of that authority.
1. Congressional Power over Recognized Tribes
The constitutional distribution of federal power over Indian affairs, though
admitting a role for both the legislature and the executive, probably favors
Congress. Because of the significant domestic impact of Indian affairs legisla-
tion, both upon the Indians2 4 and upon the states in which they live, it is
reasonable to suppose that the full bundle of executive privileges of Curtiss-
Wright does not adhere to the President in Indian affairs. Indeed, the courts
have invariably interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause as giving Congress
vast power over tribal affairs extending even to involuntary tribal dissolu-
tion," 5 with the result that its parameters may be considered well estab-
lished. Indeed, the Constitution expressly mentions authority over Indian af-
fairs only once, in the Indian Commerce Clause. As the only direct textual
commitment of Indian powers in the Constitution, this provision suggests the
Framers' intent to give Congress the dominant role in regulating relations with
the Indian tribes.216 (Nor, it should be added, do most of the explicitly presi-
federation], which did not include Indian affairs. We recognize, however, that Indian
affairs do not fall neatly into the category of either international or domestic matters,
and it is surely arguable that on matters concerning war and peace with the Indians, the
national government did possess the inherent powers that Curtiss-Wright ascribed to the
national government in the realm of traditionally "international" matters.
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1161.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 158-66.
214. Indians born within the United States have been U.S. citizens since 1924. See 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(2) (1988).
215. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
216. On the other hand, at least some things may be beyond the reach of congressional power
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-28
(1lth Cir. 1994) (finding Indian Commerce Clause to give no power to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity). But see Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding congressional power under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
The drafters of the Articles of Confederation, it appears, believed the central government's
authority to deal with the Indians, including its power to make treaties with the tribes, derived
from the Indian Commerce Clause's confederal antecedent, Article IX, cl. 4 of the Articles of
Confederation. Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1155 (discussing the intent of drafters of Articles). As early as
1775, the Continental Congress had taken Indian affairs as its direct responsibility, dividing Indian
Country into three departments and appointing commissioners for each department who were to
supervise treaty negotiations, disbursements of the Congress's money, and the carrying-out of the
Congress's Indian policies. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 573 (M'Lean, J., concurring)
(recounting the history of federal Indian policy).
Prior to the drafting and ratification of the United States Constitution, debates raged as to
the extent that certain states should cede their western land claims to the central government.
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dential powers potentially relevant to Indian relations bear much relevance to
Twentieth Century issues of Indian policy: Congress has not ratified an Indian
treaty since 1871,27 and it has happily been a century or so since federal re-
lations with the Indian tribes implicated the President's powers as Command-
er-in-Chief.) Thus the courts and commentators are correct that the federal
power over "Indian" affairs is lodged primarily in the Congress."8
2. Recognition as a Trigger for "Indian" Commerce
The flaw in the traditional legislative-supremacy view of the constitutional
distribution of power, however, is that it ignores the constitution's clear desig-
nation of the President as the constitutional actor empowered to recognize
sovereign governments with which the United States will have political rela-
tions. '9 In one sense this might be said not to constitute a power over Indian
affairs, because it entails no power to regulate the lives of Indian tribes recog-
nized by the federal government. Nevertheless, the recognition power is a vital
aspect of federal Indian law because under the longstanding doctrines of tribal
sovereignty and intergovernmental relations, it is by federal recognition that
the legal system determines whose affairs are "Indian affairs" in the first
place. This recognition power belongs to the executive branch.
C. Disputes over Recognition
Just as the Constitution expressly commits federal power over Indian
affairs only to the legislature, it commits the power to recognize a fellow
political sovereign only to the President. Is the power of Indian recognition,
then, an exclusively executive power? The structure of the Constitution sug-
gests that it should be: the power to designate the sovereign political commu-
nities with which the United States may have relations is given to one branch,
and the power to regulate relations with certain such designated units, Indian
tribes, to another.22
Virginia, in particular, had refused to agree to such a cession unless the Continental Congress
were to nullify pre-Revolutionary purchases of land from the Indians by various speculating com-
panies. Finally, in 1784, Congress accepted Virginia's terms, a compromise effectively endorsed
by the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
With little debate, the convention's new constitution for the nation vested exclusive
authority in Congress to regulate trade and commerce and to make treaties with Indian
tribes. This was a far simpler and clearer declaration of legislative authority over Indian
tribes than the superseded Articles of Confederation contained.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 70-71; but see supra note 167 (noting that treaty-negotiating
power of President, though of little practical import in absence of congressional ratification, is also
relevant to Indian affairs under the United States Constitution).
217. See supra note 167.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 158-66.
219. The recognition power derives from the express textual commitment to the President of
the power to "appoint Ambassadors" with Senatorial approval, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and
to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" from other sovereign powers, id. art. 1I, § 3.
The latter power does not contain any requirement of Senatorial approval.
220. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (noting that with respect to
recognition of foreign sovereigns, "the Executive [has] authority to speak as the sole organ of [the
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However, the courts have not seemed to agree with this position. Judges
have long upheld the power of Congress to terminate the federal-tribal rela-
tionship,22" ' and there have been no constitutional challenges to the existing
statutory acknowledgment procedures as an unlawful restriction upon the con-
stitutional powers of the President. Until the courts clarify their position, it
appears as if the recognition and de-recognition power is possessed concur-
rently by the legislature and the executive.
What if the two branches disagree on whether or not to extend political
recognition to an Indian tribe? The courts have on occasion "order[ed] the
executive branch of the federal government to honor tribal status for a par-
ticular purpose when that is deemed to have been the intent of Congress." '222
But if the independent recognition power of the executive branch has not
hitherto been understood, the issue has yet really to be posed. The present
regulatory scheme of Indian tribal acknowledgment denies administrative
recognition by the Secretary of the Interior to any group "subject [to] congres-
sional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal rela-
tionship." '223 Yet this recognition scheme is one established pursuant to the
Secretary's statutory authority under 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1988); it is not one de-
rived from the executive's independent constitutional power to recognize for-
eign sovereigns. Of course this position prohibits conflict with prior congres-
sional enactments. But if the President possesses an independent recognition
power, he might be able to recognize even a group so proscribed by the legis-
lature. What would happen if the issue, thus cast, were presented to a court?
One possibility is that the political character of tribal recognition would
necessarily make such a dispute an nonjusticiable political question. As the
Supreme Court defined it in Baker v. Carr, "[tihe nonjusticiability of a politi-
cal question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." '224
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
national] government"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 197, § 204 ("Under the Constitution
of the United States, the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a for-
eign state or government, and to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with a foreign
government."); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (upholding power of
President to settle claims of U.S. citizens as incident to recognition power since "[nlo such obsta-
cle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another na-
tion"). Tribal governments, of course, are not genuinely foreign governments, but the power to
recognize a fellow political sovereign certainly seems to be quite centralized. Indeed, the President
appears also to have the power unilaterally to terminate a formal treaty. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to consider challenge to President's ability to terminate treaty with
Taiwan by recognizing People's Republic of China). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides that
[tiermination of a treaty by the President is not 'repeal' of a 'law'; it is an international
act terminating an international legal obligation. Terminating the international legal
obligation will also terminate the status of the treaty as domestic law, but that is an
incidental consequence when an international legal obligation lapses for any reason.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 197, § 339 rptr's note 1.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 149, & 151.
222. CANBY, supra note 83, at 5.
223. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(g); see also id. § 83.3(e) (similar phrasing).
224. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.22
It may be true, as Justice Jackson noted in his Youngstown concurrence, that
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter., 226 Nevertheless, the "textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment" 227 of the recognition power to the President, not to
mention the explicitly political character of all federal Indian relations-which
has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the courts-would seem to bring an exec-




Since the possibility of an independent presidential recognition power has
not yet been identified, the nonjusticiability of legislative-executive disputes
over recognition is, perhaps, an unsatisfying conclusion. Both the presidential
recognition power and the resistance to judicial determination of disputes
relating thereto, however, are consequences that flow directly from the doc-
trine of tribal sovereignty that lies at the root of federal Indian law. Federal
Indian law must ground itself exclusively in the political character of federal-
Indian relations if it is to avoid a battery of equal protection challenges and a
whole host of uncomfortable conceptual problems.
The political character of governmental relations with the tribes-the
courts' insistence that tribes are indeed sovereign powers in some meaningful
sense-may point to a new understanding of the constitutional division of
power with respect to Indian affairs. This character suggests a presidential
power to recognize or de-recognize tribal governments, and that disputes with
Congress over such matters may well be immunized from judicial review.
225. Id. at 217.
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
227. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
228. As long as tribal recognition is seen as a power exercised by the executive pursuant to
statute, it will remain possible to challenge recognition decisions on grounds, for example, that
they failed to comport with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and
conventional due process analysis. See, e.g., Greene v. Babbitt, No. 93-37010, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23370, at **17-19, 21-25 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995) (requiring hearing procedures under
APA before permitting change in tribal recognition eligibility standards).
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The extent to which this new understanding may unsettle federal Indian
policy, and produce inter-branch conflicts over Indian affairs, remains to be
seen. Absent a presidential inclination to challenge the will of the Congress
over a matter of tribal recognition or termination, no problems need arise.
Nevertheless, if the doctrines of tribal sovereignty and intergovernmental rela-
tions are taken seriously, we may sooner or later have to come to terms with
the constitutional implications of our principles.
